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University of Turin
From Postmodernism to Realism
New realism is perhaps the only philosophical movement of which one may indicate 
the exact date of birth: it was June 23, 2011 at 13.30 at the 
restaurant “Al Vinacciolo” in Via Gennaro Serra 29, Naples. 
I can be so accurate because I was there, with Markus Ga-
briel and his Italian collaborator Simone Maestrone, after 
a seminar at the Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies. 
Markus was founding an international centre of philosophy 
in Bonn and wanted to inaugurate it with a big conference. I 
told him that the right title would have been “New Realism”, 
since it captured what in my opinion was the fundamental 
character of contemporary philosophy: a certain weariness of 
postmodernism and the belief that everything is constructed, 
by language, conceptual schemes and the media. Well, it is 
not like that: something, or rather, much more than we are 
willing to admit, is not constructed – and this is a wonderful 
thing, otherwise we could not distinguish dreams from reality. 
I announced the conference a few weeks later, in an article 
published in “La Repubblica” on August 8, 2011, and since 
1  I elaborated this article in Bonn with the support of Käte Hamburger 
Kolleg “Recht als Kultur”. I wish to thank especially its director, Profes-
sor Werner Gephart. 
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then the debate has never ceased, both in Italy and abroad2, 
with contributions that include many of my writings on the 
subject,3 the book by Markus Gabriel4 and that by Mauricio 
Beuchot and José Luis Jerez.5 
Realism, just as idealism, empiricism or skepticism, is a 
constant theme in philosophy. New Realism, instead, is a 
reoccurring function: the reaction to a previous anti-realist 
hegemony. It was so in the case of American New Realism last 
century,6 with Brazilian Novo Realismo thirty-five years ago7 
and it is so in the case of contemporary New Realism, which 
was launched by my manifesto on August 8, 2011 (which, 
besides, summarized what I have been working on for the 
past twenty years).8 That this should happen in Europe, where 
postmodernism has been most influential, is not coinciden-
tal. “New realists” come from continental philosophy, where 
the weight of antirealism was far greater than in analytic 
philosophy.9 Both traditions shared a premise: there is not a 
2  For a full press review, see http //nuovorealismo.wordpress.com. For an 
analysis of the debate, see R. Scarpa, Il caso Nuovo Realismo. La lingua del 
dibattito filosofico contemporaneo (Milano-Udine: Mimesis, 2013).
3  See in particular  “Nuovo Realismo”, in Rivista di estetica, 48 (3/2011), pp. 
69-93, and my Manifesto of NewRealism (New York: SUNY Press, 2014).
4  M. Gabriel, Warum es die Welt nicht gibt (Berlin: Ullstein, 2013).
5  M. Beuchot – J.- L. Jerez, Manifiesto del nuevo realismo analógico (Buenos 
Aires: Circulo Erméneutico 2013). 
6  E. B. Holt,  W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, E. G. 
Spaulding, The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1912).
7  A. de Hollanda, O Novo sistema Neo-Realista (Fortaleza: Ceara, 1978).
8  See Estetica razionale (Milano:Raffaello Cortina, 1997). The theme of realism 
lies at the centre of my conversations with Derrida between 1993-1995: 
J. Derrida and M. Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret (Ithaca-London, Cornell 
UP, 2001). For a brief overview, see “Maurizio Ferraris” in Wikipedia. 
9  Where, to put it with Graham Harman: “With some rare and ineffectual 
exceptions (…) no one in the continental tradition was declaring realism 
devoid of ironic etymological tricks prior to 2002” (“The Current State 
of Speculative Realism”, Speculations IV (2013), p. 23). For a more detailed 
analysis, see M. Ferraris, “Introduction”, in T. Andina (ed.), Bridging the 
Analytical Continental Divide (Leiden-New York: Brill, 2014).
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“thing in itself”, but only phenomena mediated (or created) 
by our conceptual schemes and perceptual apparatuses, and 
it is in this sense that both traditions have been affected by 
a “linguistic turn”. But the linguistic turn was the result of a 
conceptual breakthrough, characterized by a prevalence of 
the concept in the construction of experience10 (and not, as 
it would be entirely reasonable to posit, in the reconstruction 
of experience, in scientific or philosophical description).
If, however, for analytical philosophers the problem was 
epistemological (“to what extent do conceptual schemes and 
language intervene in our view of the world?”), for continen-
tal thinkers the problem was political. Following what I have 
proposed to call fallacy of knowledge-power,11 postmodernism 
has cultivated the idea that reality is actually constructed by 
power for purposes of domination, and that knowledge is 
not a means for emancipation, but an instrument of power. 
I shall dub “Foukant” the philosophical function lying at the 
basis of this attitude, because (like Kant) it believes that we 
do not have direct access to knowledge and that the I think 
must necessarily accompany our representations, and (like 
Foucault, in the first phase of his thought) it deems that the I 
think and our conceptual schemes are means for the affirma-
tion of the will to power. Thus, in radical postmodernism, a 
logical step is taken so that reality is a construction of power, 
which makes it both detestable (if by “power” we mean the 
Power that dominates us) and malleable (if by “power” we 
mean “in our power”).
It was first of all politics that undermined postmodern 
hopes of emancipation.12 The advent of media populism 
provided the example of a farewell to reality that was not at all 
emancipatory, not to mention the unscrupulous use of truth 
as an ideological construction, which got to the point of start-
10  See J. Mcdowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1994). 
11  M. Ferraris, Manifesto del Nuovo Realismo (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2012), 87 
and ff.
12  Ibid, 3 and ff.
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ing a war on the bases of false evidence of weapons of mass 
destruction. In the media and in several political programs 
we have seen the real outcome of Nietzsche’s principle that 
“There are no facts, only interpretations”, which only a few 
years earlier philosophers proposed as the way to emancipa-
tion, but which in fact presented itself as the justification for 
saying and doing whatever one wanted. Thus the true meaning 
of Nietzsche’s motto turned out to be rather: “The reason of 
the strongest is always the best.” This circumstance explains 
the slight gap in time between the end of antirealism in the 
analytic world13 and the end of antirealism in the continental 
world. Nevertheless, during the seventies and eighties, there 
was much analytical antirealism and continental antirealism 
was still present in the departments of comparative literature.
Both analytic and continental antirealisms find a powerful 
theoretical justification in constructivism, which represents 
the mainstream of modern philosophy.14 Such a perspective 
argues that our conceptual schemes and perceptual appara-
tuses play a role in the constitution of reality. It is a position 
that begins with Descartes and culminates in Kant; it was then 
radicalized in the nihilistic sense by Nietzsche, or special-
ized in the epistemological, hermeneutic and psychological 
sense by several other thinkers. The basic assumption of 
this function of thought, which I propose we call “Deskant”, 
consists of two statements. The first is that we have a direct 
13  Which can be located around the seventies, with Kripke, (S. A. Kripke, 
Naming and Necessity [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980]) 
and Putnam (H. Putnam, “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, in Mind, Language 
and Reality. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. [Cambridge, MA:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1975], 215–271).
14  D. R. Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity (London: 
Routledge, 1989). For a criticism of its contemporary outcomes, see P. 
Boghossian, Fear of knowledge Against Relativism and Constructivism (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2007). I believe that it is constructivism 
– rather than the “correlationalism” questioned by Meillassoux (After 
Finitude, London, Continuum 2008) – that captures the main thread of 
modern philosophy, which does not simply lie in thinking about the 
object in correlation to the subject, but in conceiving of it as a result of 
a construction of the subject.
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relationship with our cogito and a mediated one with the 
world; the second is that the mediation operated  by thought 
and by the senses leads to the fact that the whole of reality 
turns out to be somewhat mind-dependent. 
When constructivists illustrate this second thesis they seem 
to refer to indisputable evidence and highly recognizable 
actions. For example, Nietzsche asserts that our needs and 
our saying yes or no dissolve facts into interpretations. But 
if “there are no facts, only interpretations” is the maximalist 
slogan which postulates the world’s causal and conceptual 
dependence on thought, then the mere fact that a sentence 
like “there are no cats, only interpretations” is senseless 
makes it extremely doubtful that a strong dependence (either 
causal: concepts cause objects; or conceptual: our relationship 
with objects presents, in any case, a conceptual mediation) 
should be possible. So constructionism falls back on a weak 
dependence, i.e. representational dependence15: we are not 
the creators of the universe, but we still construct it starting 
from an amorphous hyle, a cookie dough for us to shape with 
the stencils of our concepts.16 Thus the separate existence of 
the world is acknowledged, but the world as such is taken to 
have no structural and morphological autonomy, at least not 
that we know of.
Ontology and Epistemology
That is where the first move of New Realism, namely con-
ceptual clarification, takes place. If we try to give a concrete 
form to representational dependence, we will realize that the 
technical term hides a conceptual confusion between ontol-
ogy (what there is, which is independent of our representa-
tions) and epistemology (what we think we know, and that 
may be dependent on our representations – but what makes 
our statements true are not our representations, but that to 
15   R. Rorty, “Charles Taylor on Truth, in Truth and Progress”, in Philosophi-
cal Papers, vol. III, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 86.
16  H. Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 114.
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which those representations relate). According to represen-
tational dependence, an entity, say the Tyrannosaurus Rex 
(understood as a physical entity) is considered as if it were 
a zoological and linguistic notion, and it is concluded that, 
since in the absence of humans there would not be the word 
“Tyrannosaurus Rex”, then the Tyrannosaurus Rex “represen-
tationally” depends on people. Which is either a truism (if 
by “representationally” we mean something like “linguisti-
cally”) or a perfect absurdity (if by “representationally” we 
mean something – even slightly – more than that). Because 
this would imply that the being of the Tyrannosaurus Rex 
depends on us; but then, given that when the Tyrannosaurus 
Rex existed we did not, it would paradoxically follow that the 
Tyrannosaurus Rex both did and did not exist.17 
The ontological hypothesis that underlies the distinction 
between ontology and epistemology is the one – indicated 
by Schelling’s positive philosophy – for which being is not 
something constructed by thought, but it is given before 
thought comes to be. Not only because we know of intermi-
nable periods in which there was the world, but there were 
no people, but also because what initially appears as thought 
actually comes from outside of us: the words of our mother, 
the myths and rules, the totems and taboos that we encoun-
ter in everyday life are just found by us, just like in Mecca 
one comes across a meteorite. Along this line, New Realism 
proposes its distinctions, schematized as follows.18 
17  As is argued by D. Marconi, “Realismo minimale”, in M. De Caro and M. 
Ferraris, (eds.), Bentornata Realtà (Torino: Einaudi, 2012), 113–137.
18  For an articulated description, see M. Ferraris, Documentality. Why is 
Necessary to Leave Traces (New York: Fordham UP, 2012).
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EPISTEMOLOGY
Amendable
ONTOLOGY
Unamendable
Science
Linguistic
Historical
Free
Infinite
Teleological
Experience
Not necessarily linguistic
Not historical
Necessary
Finite
Not necessarily teleological
Truth
not born out of experience, 
but teleologically oriented 
towards it
Reality
not naturally oriented towards 
science
Internal World
(=internal to conceptual 
schemes) 
External World
(=external to conceptual schemes)
I will not go into a detailed explanation, which will be the 
subject of the next pages; I will only suggest the reasons for 
the confusion, which I consider to be fatal, between ontology 
and epistemology. This confusion was caused by Deskant, 
driven by the need to re-establish, through construction, a 
world with more stability, because it is assumed that nature 
as such is contingent.
In order to do so, what Deskant does is resort to what I pro-
pose we call transcendental fallacy19: if all knowledge begins 
with experience, but the latter is structurally uncertain, then 
it will be necessary to found experience through science, find-
ing a priori structures to stabilize its uncertainty. To achieve 
this, we need a change of perspective: we have to start from 
the subjects rather than the objects, and ask ourselves – in 
accordance with the matrix of all subsequent construction-
19  For a detailed analysis of the transcendental fallacy, see M. Ferraris, 
Goodbye Kant!, What still stands of the Critique of the Pure Reason (New 
York: SUNY Press, 2013). 
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ism – not how things are in themselves, but how they should 
be made in order to be known by us, following the model of 
physicists who question nature not as scholars, but as judges: 
that is, using schemes and theorems.
Deskant then adopts an a priori epistemology, i.e. mathematics, 
to found ontology: the possibility of synthetic a priori judg-
ments allows us to fixate an otherwise fluid reality through 
a certain knowledge. In this way, transcendental philosophy 
moved constructionism from the sphere of mathematics to 
that of ontology.20 The laws of physics and mathematics are 
applied to reality and, in Deskant’s hypothesis, they are not 
the contrivance of a group of scientists, but they are the way 
in which our minds and senses actually work. Our knowledge, 
at this point, will no longer be threatened by the unreliabil-
ity of the senses and the uncertainty of induction, but the 
price we have to pay is that there is no longer any difference 
between the fact that there is an object X and the fact that we 
know the object X – that is, the confusion between ontology 
and epistemology, only partially avoided by Kant through the 
hypothesis of the noumenon (which post-Kantians did not 
hesitate to abandon). 
Making perceptual experience (and not, as we will see 
shortly, social experience) depend on the conceptual means 
falling into what psychologists call “stimulus error”: namely 
the ease with which we are led to mistake an observation 
for an explanation. It is the ease with which, with our eyes 
closed, we respond “nothing” or “black” to the question 
“what do you see?”, when instead we are seeing phosphenes 
and gleams. Yet we do not account for those at a descriptive 
level, because what we are talking about is something else: a 
theory of vision for which the eye is like a camera obscura, 
and when the diaphgram is closed absolute darkness reigns. 
When one argues that observers equipped with different 
theories see reality differently21 one gives a philosophical 
20  A. Ferrarin, “Construction and Mathematical schematism. Kant on the 
Exhibition of a Concept in Intuition”, in Kant-Studien, 86, 1995, pp. 131–174.
21  T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of 
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dignity to a psychological error, and most importantly one 
makes a category mistake that lies in confusing seeing with 
knowing. For example, if I read the word “rapresentational 
dependence” (sic) I think of “representational dependence”, 
but I see “rapresentational dependence” (sic).
Now, it makes perfect sense to assume that there is a con-
ceptual action when I recognize a constellation,22 or when, 
looking at three objects, I believe – like Leśniewski – that for 
every two objects there is one which is their sum, increasing 
the total number of objects.23 But this conflict can be explained 
by the simple consideration that we cannot see properly 
neither constellations nor Leśniewski’s objects, but only the 
stars and the three objects of common sense.
This is not to argue that constellations are not real, but 
rather to draw a distinction (which obviously stems from 
the difference between ontology and epistemology) between 
two layers of reality that fade into each other. The first is 
what I would call ε-reality, meaning by this “epistemological 
reality”, or what the Germans call “Realität”. It is the reality 
linked to what we think we know about what there is (which 
is why I call it “epistemological”). This is the reality referred 
to by Kant when he says that “intuitions without concepts 
are blind”; or by Quine when he says that “to be is to be the 
value of a variable.” But next to, or rather below, the ε-reality 
I also set the ω-reality in the sense of ὄντως (I use the omega 
just to make a distinction): the ontological reality, or what 
the Germans call “Wirklichkeit”, which refers to what there 
is whether we know it or not, and which manifests itself both 
as a resistance and as positivity. The ω-reality is the external 
world, expression by which, as we have seen in the scheme, 
I design the world external to conceptual schemes. 
Chicago Press, 1962). 
22  N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, Hackett: 1978).
23  H. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (LaSalle: Open Court, 1987), chs. 1, 
2; and “Truth and Convention: On Davidson’s Refutation of Conceptual 
Relativism”, Dialectica 41 (1987), 69–77 (reprinted in H. Putnam, Realism 
with a Human Face, [Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990], 
96–104).
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At this point it is better to introduce, next to the difference 
between ontology and epistemology, also a difference between 
ontological independence and epistemological indepen-
dence. The way in which the problem of realism has been 
set in the analytical area defines realism as independence 
of truth from the knowledge we have of it. For New Realism, 
instead, it is independence of reality from the knowledge we 
have of it (although for certain classes of objects things are 
different). I believe this aspect is important because truth is, 
in any case, an epistemological function, which presupposes 
minds: a sentence like “On September 17, 1873 Bismarck had 
a flu” is causally independent of minds, but it presupposes 
minds . And so (we will get back to this) the formula of the 
independence of truth from the minds lends itself well to 
some aspects of social reality. On the other hand, when it 
comes to reality in its most general sense, I would define real-
ism in the following terms: realism is the belief that natural 
objects (and possibly other types of objects to be specified 
every time) are independent of our means of knowing them; 
they are existent or non-existent in virtue of a reality existing 
independently of us.24
Unamendability
The second move made by New Realism, after that of con-
ceptual clarification, it is empirical observation. There is a 
class of representations that the I think will never be able to 
accompany: that of the infinite number of things that existed 
before any I think. I call this argument pre-existence25: the 
world is given prior to any cogito. Then there are classes 
of representations that, even though accompanied by the I 
think, seem to resist it, regardless of the “representational 
24  Borrowing Dummett’s definition, although he spoke of “truth” instead of 
“reality” (M.Dummett, “Realism” (1963), later in Truth and Other Enigmas 
(Harvard University Press: 1978), 145–165.
25  Meillassoux, After Finitude.
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dependence”; I call this argument resistance26: reality may 
oppose refusals to our conceptual schemes. And then it often 
happens that the I think successfully interacts with beings 
presumably devoid of any I think, for example with animals; 
I call this argument interaction: beings with different con-
ceptual schemes can interact in the same world. 
I collect these empirical circumstances – which, however, 
have a transcendental role, since they define, even though in 
retrospect, our possibilities of knowledge – under the name 
of unamendability27: the key feature of what there is is its 
prevalence over epistemology, because it cannot be corrected 
– and this is, after all, an infinitely more powerful necessity 
than any logical necessity.
Unamendability is a non-conceptual content28 and a contras-
tive principle, which manifests the real as not-I. It concerns 
the sphere of experience that lies outside of that of concepts, 
defining an extraneous world external to knowledge. Non-
conceptual content is a contrast (resistance), something that 
cannot be nullified. At the same time, it is also an autonomous 
organisation of experience (interaction), which reduces the 
burden of the ordering activity that is attributed to conceptual 
schemes. It is in view of these circumstances that I have given 
a peculiar ontological value to the recovery of aesthetics as 
a theory of perception,29 not because it is first and foremost 
a source of knowledge, but, on the contrary, because it can 
occasionally constitute a stumbling block for conceptual 
schemes. At least three consequences follow from this.
The first regards the prevalence of ontology over episte-
mology. In its resistance, the real is the extreme negative of 
knowledge, because it is the inexplicable and the incorrigible; 
26  M. Ferraris, “Esistere è resistere”, in Bentornata Realtà,  139–165. 
27  M. Ferraris, “Causality and Unamendableness”, in Gestalt Theory, 28:4 
(2006), 401–407; M.Ferraris “Reality as Unamendability”, in L. Cataldi 
Madonna (ed.), Naturalistische Hermeneutik (Wuerzburg: Koenigshausen 
u. Neumann, 2013), 113–129.
28  G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)..
29  See M. Ferraris, Experimentelle Ästhetik (Vienna: Turia und Kant, 2001).
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but it is also the positive extreme of being, because it is what 
is given, insists and resists interpretation, and at the same 
time makes it true, distinguishing it from fantasy or wishful 
thinking. And we must not forget that in areas dependent on 
conceptual schemes, such as historical events, we are dealing 
with a clear manifestation of unamendability, which is the 
irrevocability of the past events on which the interpretations 
of historians are constructed. Now, interpretations take place 
on the basis of facts and facts occur in a world of objects. If 
this is the case, the acknowledgment of facts in the physical 
world (for example, the fact that snow is white) is placed at a 
perfectly continuous level with respect to the acknowledg-
ment of facts in the historical and moral world.
Secondly, this does not mean in any way that reality coincides 
with the experience of the senses, or that unamendability 
comes down to perception. It simply means that unamend-
ability deconstructs the claim of the ontologically constitutive 
action of conceptual schemes.30 In the case of perception, 
we only have one area of unamendability, which happens to 
be of  particular evidence because sometimes we experience 
an aesthetic antinomy with regard to conceptual schemes. 
The basic argument here does not consist in saying that the 
stick immersed in water appears broken because it really is 
broken, but to point out that, although we know that the stick 
immersed in water is not broken, we can do nothing but see 
it broken.31
Thirdly, we can draw from the aesthetic antinomy a more 
general point, which concerns the ontological autonomy of 
the world with regard to conceptual schemes and perceptual 
apparatuses. Reality has a structured nature which precedes 
conceptual schemes and can resist them. So there is no need 
to rely on an a priori epistemology to stabilize contingency. 
One of our most common experiences is that we interact 
30  See P. Bozzi, Fisica Ingenua (Garzanti: Milano, 1990).
31  M. Ferraris, “Metzger, Kant and the Perception of Causality”, in The Dialogue. 
Yearbook of Philosophical Hermeneutics, 1 (2001), 126–134, and M.Ferraris, 
“Why Perception Matters”,  Phenomenology and Mind, 4 (2013), 48–61..
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with beings who have conceptual schemes and perceptual 
apparatuses different from our own (or that do not have such 
things at all), such as dogs, cats, flies and so forth. Well, if in-
teraction depended on conceptual schemes and knowledge, 
it would be somehow miraculous. Unless we wish to resort 
to the hypothesis of a miracle or a pre-established harmony, 
we are forced to admit that interaction is made  possible by 
the sharing of a common and homogeneous space, and of 
objects endowed with positivity that are independent of our 
conceptual schemes.
This is what I have illustrated elsewhere under the title slipper 
experiment, 32 showing how it is a very common experience 
that there is interaction between beings with very different 
conceptual schemes, perceptual apparatuses, dimensions 
and forms of life. And the ability of superorganisms such as 
a termite moulds to structure complex articulations in the 
total absence of a central control system is widely studied by 
zoologists.33 Of course, I never thought that myself, a dog and a 
constructivist all see the world the same way. I am saying that 
we can interact despite the fact that our conceptual schemes 
and perceptual apparatuses are different.
Affordance
Hence the third move of New Realism. If things are as I have 
described above, then reality does not only manifest itself as 
resistance and negativity: every negation entails a determi-
nation and a possibility. The world exerts an affordance,34 
32  M. Ferraris, Il Mondo Esterno (Milano: Bompiani, 2001), 90–91. The Ge-
dankenexperiment  through which I develop the argument of interaction 
appears in English in M. Ferraris, “What is it Like to be a Slipper”, in The 
Dialogue,  1 (2002), 164–169.
33  Hölldobler and E.O. Wilson, The Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance, and 
Strangeness of Insect Societies (New York: W.W. Norton & C., 2008).
34  By using the term “affordance” I am referring to a notion that has been 
widely popular last century: see J.J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to 
Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979); K. Lewin, “Untersu-
chungen zur Handlungs- und Affekt-Psychologie. I. Vorbemerkung über 
die psychischen Kräfte und Energien und über die Struktur der Seele”, 
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through the objects and the environment, that qualifies as 
a positive realism.35 Strong, independent and stubborn, the 
world of objects that surround us (including the subjects we 
interact with, which are another kind of objects) does not 
merely say no: it does not only resist us, as if to say “here I 
am, I am here.” It is also the greatest ontological positivity, 
because its very resistance, opacity and refusal to come to 
terms with concepts and thought are what assures us that the 
world of objects we deal with is not a dream. 
Children in a pre-linguistic age are already able to segment 
linguistic reality into objects36 – which for Deskant, strictly 
speaking, would not be possible, given that, presumably, they 
do not possess the scheme of substance as permanence in 
time. The thesis I defend through the argument of affordance37 
is that we should start from the objects (an area in which, 
as I said, subjects are also included), so as to reduce the gap 
between our theories and our experience of the world. This 
is not meant to be a futile worship of objectivity (which is a 
property of knowledge, not of being), but a due recognition 
of the positivity on which we all rely, but upon which we 
rarely reflect.
And this does not only apply to physical experiences: the way 
in which beauty, or moral value or non-value come forward is 
clearly something that comes from outside of us, surprising 
and striking us. And it has value first of all because it comes 
from outside: otherwise it would be nothing but imagination. 
Psychologische Forschung, 7, (1926), 294–329. Fichte already spoke of an 
“Aufforderungskaracter” of the real, see J. G. Fichte, Grundlage des Natur-
rechts (“Zweiter Lehrsatz”) (1796), ch. 1, § 3, Gesamtausgabe der bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschften, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 
I/3, 342–351. 
35  M. Ferraris, “New Realism as Positive Realism”, META. Research in Herme-
neutics, Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy, Special Issue on New 
Realism, (2014), 172–213.
36  C.E. von Hoften ed E.S. Spelke, “Object Perception and Object-directed 
Reaching in Infancy”, in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114 
(1985), 198–211.
37  I have extensively dwelt on this in my Documentality.
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That is why, contrary to what is often said, one cannot distin-
guish the value from the fact: trivially, this is because the fact 
is itself a value, and the highest one, i.e. positivity, 38 which in 
turn is the condition of possibility of each value. 
We can better understand this by means of the experiment 
of the ethical brain, which is a variation of the Gedankenex-
periment  of the brain in a vat.39 The idea is this: imagine that 
a mad scientist has put some brains in a vat and is feeding 
them artificially. By means of electrical stimulation, these 
brains have the impression of living in a real world, but in fact 
what they feel is the result of simple electrical stimulations. 
Imagine that those stimulations depict situations that require 
moral stances: some snitch and some sacrifice themselves 
for freedom, some commit embezzlement and some commit 
acts of holiness. Can we really say that in those circumstances 
there are moral acts? In my opinion, we cannot: these are, in 
the best case scenario, representations with moral content. 
Without the positivity of objects, no morality is possible.  
Everything, including corporations, symbolist poems and 
categorical imperatives, has its origin in the affordance of-
fered by the environment. A cave has affordances for different 
types of beings and serves as a shelter because it has certain 
characteristics and not others. Ecosystems, state organizations, 
interpersonal relationships: in each of these infinitely more 
complex structures we find the same structure of resistance 
and affordance. I define “environment” every sphere in which 
these interactions take place, from an ecological niche to the 
social world – of course, each with its own characteristics. In 
an environment sense “is given”: it is not at our disposal. The 
sense is a mode of organization for which something occurs 
in a given way. But, in fact, it does not ultimately depend on 
subjects.
It is with this regard that I believe we should set against 
Markus Gabriel’s thesis “To exist is to exist in a field of sense” 
38  See H. Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (Tübingen: J. B. C. Mohr, 1915). 
39  H. Putnam, “Brains in a vat”, in Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1–22.
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the thesis “To exist is to resist in an environment”.40 The no-
tion of “field of sense”, as it is brilliantly defined by Gabriel, 
risks making existence depend on the possession of a sense. 
Now, an event or an object – from the Holocaust to Kafka’s 
Odradek – can seem to be utterly senseless, but this does 
not mean that the event did not take place or that the object 
does not exist. The fact that more often than we wish we find 
ourselves unable to find any meaning in our lives does not 
mean that we are not existing. The perspective suggested by 
“To exist is to exist in an environment”, instead, is that of a 
structurally opaque existence that manifests itself first of all 
in its persistence and possibly in its acting in an environ-
ment, without further qualifications. In other words, the field 
of sense is in the environment and not in the head; it is in 
the affordance and not in the concepts. Obviously, starting 
from the objects and from the opacity of existence involves 
being aware that there can never be a full totality, and rather 
that our relationship with the world is a confusing balance 
between ontology and epistemology.41 This, however, does not 
mean that the positivity of objects is precluded to us. Indeed, 
it is this very positivity that allows us to dwell in the world 
despite the fact that our notions are rarely clear and distinct.
It is in this environment that the emergence of thought 
from being occurs; such a process can be regarded as the 
development of an (intelligent) epistemology on the basis 
of an unintelligent ontology, a competence that precedes 
comprehension.42 If the thesis of constructivism is that a 
disembodied mind constitutes the real, here we have a sharp 
reversal: thought arises on the ground of reality, being a highly 
40  See M. Gabriel, Warum es die Welt nicht gibt (Ullstein Verlag: Berlin, 2013).
41  As posited by Tim Button in The Limits of Realism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), we have to locate ourselves between external 
realism (ontology) and internal realism (epistemology), but we do not 
know at what exact point. If we knew, I believe we would be dealing with 
absolute knowledge. 
42  See D.C. Dennett, “Darwin’s ‘strange inversion of reasoning’”, in Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106 
Suppl. 1 (2009), 10061–10065.
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specialized product of evolution. This circumstance explains 
why epistemology could successfully relate to ontology, as the 
history of science proves. Hence the thesis of the dependence 
(of which we have already spoken) and, furthermore, of the 
derivation of epistemology from ontology. All the essential 
differences that govern our thinking – and that we tend to 
forget in thought, even though they guide our practices – are 
derived from the real, and not from thought: think of the 
differences between ontology and epistemology, experience 
and science, the external world and the internal world, objects 
and events, facts and fiction.
So, metaphysical realism (if we grant that such a position ever 
really existed as it is represented by antirealists) supposes a 
full mirroring of thought and reality: 
 
(1) Thought ←→ Reality
Constructivism, finding this relation between two distinct 
realities incomprehensible, suggests a constitutive role of 
thought with respect to reality:
 
(2) Thought  → Reality
Positive realism, instead, sees thought as an emerging datum 
of reality, just like gravity, photosynthesis and digestion. 
 
(3) Thought ← Reality
At this point it becomes possible to articulate the character-
istics of the environment. We need to begin by introducing, 
next to the categories of natural objects (which exist in space 
and time independently of subjects) and ideal objects (which 
exist outside of space and time, independently of subjects), 
two new categories: that of artifacts, which exist in space and 
time depending on the subjects for their genesis, and that of 
social objects, which exist in space and time depending on 
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the subjects for their genesis and their persistence.43 From 
this point of view, it is entirely legitimate to assert that the 
stock market or democracy are representationally depen-
dent (I will soon try to clarify this term since, as we have 
seen, it is rather obscure) on our collective beliefs. But this 
does not mean in any way that dinosaurs have some degree 
of dependence with respect to our collective beliefs. If any-
thing, dependence concerns professorships in paleontology. 
But professorships in paleontology do not make dinosaurs 
exist, while the statements of rating agencies do increase or 
decrease the credit spread. 
In this sense I claim, with a form of contextualism, that 
one is never fully realistic nor antirealists. There are spheres 
of being that can be more or less close to the focal meaning 
of existence as resistance in an environment. These spheres 
are reconstructed as things in themselves and not as phe-
nomena. Let us begin with natural objects. For Deskant, they 
are the phenomena par excellence: they are situated in space 
and time, and yet they are not to be found in nature. They are 
in our heads, along with the categories we use to give order 
to the world, to the point that, without human beings, space 
and time may disappear as well. It should follow that before 
people there were no objects, at least not as we know them, 
but clearly (as we have seen) it is not so.
Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that social objects, 
which depend on subjects (though they are not subjective), 
are also things in themselves and not phenomena. This may 
seem complicated at first because, if social objects depend on 
conceptual schemes, then it should obviously follow that they 
are phenomena. But it is not so. In order to be a phenom-
enon, it is not enough to depend on conceptual schemes. A 
phenomenon must also be in contrast with things in them-
selves. Let us consider a fine. What would be its “in itself”? 
To say that a fine is an apparent fine is to simply say that it is 
not a fine. Above all, people are things in themselves, while 
43 See Documentality, and M. Ferraris, “Diversity of Social Objects. Outlines of 
a Theory”, in Human Diversity and the Law, ed. by M. Bussani e M. Graziadei 
(Brussels-Berne-Athens: Stämpfli-Bruyland-Sakkoulas, 2005), 135–178.
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in Deskant’s view they would turn into ghosts or shadowy 
projections of thought. 
And now let us come to events, things like hurricanes or 
car accidents. Which are often unpredictable. Irregularity, 
what disregards our data and expectations, is the clearest 
demonstration of the fact that the world is much more ex-
tensive and unpredictable than our thinking.
Documentality
There is one last move made by New Realism on which I 
would like to draw your attention; it regards realism about 
social objects. A theory of mind-dependence will always 
have intrinsically obscure aspects because it does not entail 
a simple causal dependence. For social objects to exist, it is 
necessary that there are at least two minds and normally, in 
complex phenomena, there are many more. In such complex 
cases, many minds do not think in any way about the object 
and yet they interfere with the process, while many others 
do think about it and yet are unable to successfully interfere 
with it (think of a financial crisis, or a war). Apparently, we 
are dealing with a puzzle: social objects, as we have seen, 
are dependent on the mind, but they are independent of 
knowledge (i.e. even of consciousness). A marriage that no-
body knows anything about did still take place; in the same 
way, there may be a recession even though no one suspects it.
How is this possible? Does this not mean to argue that social 
objects are both dependent on, and independent of, the mind? 
No, it does not. The contradiction would present itself only if 
“mind dependence” were understood as dependence on one 
mind, as if anyone could determine the course of the social 
world. But this assumption is contradicted by any experi-
ence of the social world (my mind does not make the laws, 
nor the prices, at most it can write this article), as well as by 
the fact that in many circumstances our own mind seems to 
be independent of itself, such as when we develop obsessive 
thoughts that we would rather not have. 
Even though we no longer have a contradiction between 
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“dependence on the mind” and “independence from knowl-
edge”, we still have to explain how social objects can persist 
even when we do not have consciousness or knowledge of 
them. That is why I argue that the foundation of the social 
environment is what I proposed we call documentality.44 
Documentality is the whole of the documents and record-
ings45 that fill up our lives, not the sum of individual and 
collective intentionalities. In fact, when dealing with social 
objects we are not dealing with a series of intentionalities 
that consciously keep the object alive, so to speak, as if we all 
thought at the same time about the Constitution. It is not so: 
the Constitution is written, and at this point it is valid even if 
no one thinks about it (which in fact happens all too often).
Thus, from the perspective of documentality, the constitu-
tive law of social objects is object = inscribed act. That is to 
say that a social object is the result of a social act (such as 
to involve at least two people, or a delegated machine and a 
person) that is characterized by being recorded, on a piece 
of paper, on a computer file, or even only in the minds of the 
people involved in the act. Once recorded, the social object, 
dependent on minds as to its genesis, becomes independent 
as to its existence – the same thing happens in the case of 
artifacts, with the only important difference that an artifact 
can offer its affordance even in the absence of minds (a table 
can be a shelter for an animal), while a document cannot. 
44  In addition to the aforementioned Documentality, I refer the reader back 
to M. Ferraris, “Documentality Or why nothing social exists beyond 
the text”,  in Christian Kanzian, Edmund Runggaldier (eds.) Cultures. 
Conflict - Analysis – Dialogue, Proceedings of the 29th International Ludwig 
Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria, Publications of the Austrian 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. New Series 3, (2007), 385–401; M.Ferraris 
“Documentality, or Europe”, The Monist 92:2, (2009), pp. 286-314, and 
M.Ferraris “Social ontology and documentality”, in Riccardo Pozzo and 
Marco Sgarbi (eds.) Eine Typologie der Formen der Begriffsgeschichte, Archiv 
für Begriffsgeschichte, Sonderheft 7 (2010), 133–148.
45  M. Ferraris, “Science of Recording”, in  Herbert Hrachovec, Alois Pichler 
(eds.) Philosophy of the Information Society, Proceedings of the 30th Interna-
tional Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg 2007, Frankfurt/M, 
Ontos Verlag, (2008), 110–123.
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The fact that the meaning is not in the head, but in the world46 
is well illustrated, in my opinion, precisely by the relationship 
between affordance and documentality.
In addition to solving the puzzle of mind-dependence and 
independence from consciousness, documentality also al-
lows us to provide a more solid basis for the constitutive rule 
proposed by the most influential theorist of social objects, 
John Searle: namely the rule “X counts as Y in C” (the physical 
object X counts as the social object Y in the context C).47 The 
limit of such proposal is twofold. On the one hand, it does 
not seem able to account for complex social objects (such as 
businesses) or negative entities (such as debts, in which case 
it seems difficult to find a corresponding physical object). On 
the other hand, it makes the entire social reality depend on 
the action of a completely mysterious entity (as opposed to 
documents), that is, collective intentionality, which allegedly 
manages the transformation of the physical into the social.
According to the version that I propose, on the contrary, it 
is very easy to account for the totality of social objects, from 
informal promises to businesses and even negative entities 
such as debts. In all these cases there is a minimal structure, 
which is guaranteed by the presence of at least two people 
who commit an act (which may consist of a gesture, a word, 
or writing) that can be recorded on some support, even if it 
were only human memory. In addition to accounting for the 
physical basis of the social object – which is not an X avail-
able for the action of collective intentionality, but a recording 
that can take place in multiple ways – the rule that I propose 
(and which I call the “rule of documentality” as opposed to 
the “rule of intentionality”) has the advantage of not making 
social reality depend on a function, i.e. collective intention-
ality. In fact, such function is dangerously close to a purely 
mental process: this led Searle to make a statement that is 
anything but realistic, namely that the economic crisis is 
46  See H. Putnam, “The meaning of ‘meaning’”, 227.
47  J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
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largely the result of imagination.48 From my perspective, on 
the contrary, since this is a form of documentality, money is 
anything but imaginary, and this circumstance allows us to 
draw a distinction between the social (what records the acts 
of at least two people, even if the recording takes place in 
the minds of those people and not on external documents) 
and the mental (which can take place only in the mind of a 
single person).
One last consideration about hermeneutics,49 which postmod-
ernism rather weirdly has claimed the monopoly of. By this I 
do not at all mean to argue that there are no interpretations in 
the social world. But the first and fundamental interpretation 
consists in discerning between what can be interpreted and 
what cannot be interpreted, what links exist between ontology 
and epistemology and what is the relevance of the latter with 
regard to natural, social and ideal objects. In the social world, 
epistemology undoubtedly matters to a great extent because 
it is constitutive with respect to ontology (whereas, in the 
natural world, it is only reconstructive: it finds something 
that exists independently of epistemology); what we think, 
what we say, our interactions are all crucial, and it is crucial 
that these interactions are recorded and documented. This is 
why the social world is full of documents: in archives, in our 
drawers, in our wallets, and now even in our mobile phones.50. 
Thus it becomes possible to assign the realist intuition and 
the constructivist one each to their sphere of competence. 
48  “It is, for example, a mistake to treat money and other such instru-
ments as if they were natural phenomena like the phenomena studied 
in physics, chemistry, and biology. The recent economic crisis makes 
it clear that they are products of massive fantasy.” J. Searle, Making the 
Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, New York, Oxford 
University Press 2010, p. 201.
49  On this topic, see M. Ferraris, “A New Realist Approach to Hermeneutics”, 
in Phainomena (Ljubljana), Selected Essays in Contemporary Italian 
Philosophy, XXI, 82-83, November 2012, pp. 67-83.
50  M. Ferraris, Where are you? Ontology of the Mobile Phone, New York, 
Fordham UP 2014. See also “Where are you? Mobile ontology”, in Mobile 
Understanding. The Epistemology of Ubiquitous Communication, ed by 
di K. Nyíri, Vienna, Passagen Verlag 2006, pp. 41-52.
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1. Natural objects are independent of epistemology and make 
natural science true. 2. Ontology is independent of epistemol-
ogy. 3. Social objects are dependent on epistemology, without 
being subjective. 4. “Intuitions without concepts are blind” 
applies primarily to social objects (where it has a constructive 
value), and less to the epistemological approach to the natural 
world (where it has a reconstructive value).51 5. The realist 
intuition and the constructionist intuition have therefore 
equal legitimacy in their respective fields of application.
My final thesis is that that intentionality derives from 
documentality. Postmodern thinkers much insisted on the 
fact that the subject should not be considered as a fundamental 
datum, but their position usually did not go much beyond 
the criticism of the “Cartesian subject” and the mere hypoth-
esis that the subject is conditioned by culture. I believe the 
prospect of documentality provides the basis for a positive 
development. It begins with the theory that – from its ancient 
to its modern supporters – conceives of the mind as a tabula 
on which to lay inscriptions. In fact, as we have seen, there 
is a powerful action of inscriptions in social reality: social 
behaviours are determined by laws, rituals and norms; social 
structures and education form our intentions. 
Imagine an Arche-Robinson Crusoe as the first and last 
man on the face of the earth. Could he really be devoured by 
the ambition to become an admiral, a billionaire or a court 
poet? Certainly not, just as he could not sensibly aspire to 
follow trends, or to collect baseball cards or still lives. And if, 
say, he tried to produce a document, he would be undertaking 
an impossible task, because to make a document there must 
be at least two people, the writer and the reader. In fact, our 
Arche-Robinson would not even have a language, and one 
could hardly say that he would “think” in the usual sense of 
the term.52 And it would seem difficult to argue that he was 
51  M. Ferraris, “Kant and Social Objects”, in Kant und die Aufklaerung, ed 
by Luigi Cataldi Madonna and Paola Rumore, Hildesheim – Zuerich – 
New York, Georg Olms Verlag 2011, pp. 229-237.
52  In agreement with the argument against private language proposed by 
Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, paragraphs 243-421). There 
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proud, arrogant or in love, for roughly the same reason why 
it would be absurd to pretend he had friends or enemies.
We thus have two circumstances that reveal the social structure 
of the mind. On the one hand, the mind cannot arise unless 
it is immersed in the social, made up of education, language, 
communication and recording of behaviours. On the other 
hand, there is the huge category of social objects. Rather than 
sketching a world at the subject’s total disposal, the sphere 
of social objects reveals the inconsistency of solipsism: the 
fact that in the world there are also others in addition to us is 
proven by the existence of these objects, which would not have 
a raison d’etre in a world where there was only one subject. If it 
was not possible to keep traces, there would be no mind, and 
it is not by chance that the mind was traditionally depicted as 
a tabula rasa, a support on which impressions and thoughts 
are inscribed. But without the possibility of inscription there 
would not even be social objects, which consist precisely in 
the recording of social acts, starting from the fundamental 
one of the promise. And, if this is the case, perhaps we should 
translate Aristotle’s sentence that man is a zoon logon echon 
as: man is an animal endowed with inscriptions, or rather 
(since one of the meanings of logos in Greek is “promise”, 
“given word”) as “man is an animal that promises.”53 
must be at least two people not only to produce a document, but also to 
have a language.
53 “To breed an animal with the right to make promises - is not this the para-
doxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man?” F. Nietzsche, 
The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 57. 
